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Shape-Shifters, Masqueraders, & Subversives: An 
Argument for the Liberation of Transgendered 
Individuals 
Hasan Shafiqullah* 
INTRODUCTION 
As sex reassignment surgery becomes more commonplace 1 and drag 
queens run for the U.S. Presidency,2 the simple days of labeling gender by 
unquestioningly assigning blue for boys and pink for girls3 appear to be 
passing. With increasing stridency, a growing number of people are ques-
tioning what it means to be a woman or a man, and whether they want to be 
exclusively either. As individuals push against the limits of settled under-
standings around sex and gender, society is responding by pushing people 
back into simplistic and well-established behavioral and identity categories.4 
* Queer, transgendered, Bangladeshi-American member of the Class of 1997. Special 
thanks to Robin Haaland and Shannon Minter for their invaluable insights and support. 
1. Peter Pallot, Sex-Change Operations Increase by a Third, DAILY TELEGRAPH 
(London), July 8, 1993, at 5 (noting a three-fold increase in operations in Great Britain 
over a seven-year period); Sandra Davie, Mount E Stops All Sex-Change Ops, STRAITS 
TIMES (Sing.), July 6, 1992, at 2 (noting how Singapore has "grown to be one of the 
world's major centres [sic] for sex-change operations," with over 500 having been per-
formed in the country since the first one in 1971). 
2. Achy Obejas, Documentary Goes Blakk to the Future, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 18, 1994, at 
2 (discussing the candidacy of San Francisco drag celebrity Joan Jett Blakk). 
3. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake 0/ Sex Discrimination Law: The Disag-
gregation o/Sex/rom Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1,63 (1995). Note, however, that "[i]n 
the early years of the twentieth century, before World War I, boys wore pink ('a stronger, 
more decided color,' according to the promotional literature of the time) while girls wore 
blue (understood to be 'delicate' and 'dainty'). Only after World War II ... did the pres-
ent alignment of the two genders with pink and blue come into being." MARJORIE GARBER, 
VESTED INTERESTS: CRoss-DRESSING & CULTURAL ANXIETY 1 (1992), quoted in Franke 
supra, at 63 n.256 [hereinafter GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS]' 
4. Foucault has put this social reaction in perspective: 
Do we truly need a true sex? With a persistence that borders on stubborn-
ness, modern Western societies have answered in the affirmative. They 
have obstinately brought into play this question of a "true sex" in an order 
of things where one might have imagined that all that counted was the re-
ality of the body and the intensity of its pleasures. 
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Asserting the arbitrariness of gender as a social construction, this Note 
will explore and criticize the use of the law to prosecute and persecute peo-
ple who violate conventional gender roles. Using the emerging concept of a 
"trans gender" identity, I will challenge the validity of gender essentialism 
and argue for the adoption of variable gender identities. 
As a threshold matter, I offer the following defmitions and distinctions: 
Sex refers to the biological determination of "male" versus "female;" gender 
refers to the socially constructed identities characterized by "masculinity" 
and "femininity." For example, while it is a sex distinction that men typi-
cally have a larger Adam's apple (thyroid cartilage) than women,5 it is a 
gender distinction that most men typically do not wear dresses while many 
women at times do.6 
Transvestites are generally defmed as being "anatomic males who have 
an episodic, compelling desire to wear women's clothes."7 They are gener-
ally heterosexual, and find women's clothes sexually arousing.8 Cross-
dressers, by contrast, are either women dressing in traditionally male cloth-
ing or men dressing in traditionally female clothing, without the erotic over-
tones of transvestitism. 9 Transsexuals are considered discontent with the 
anatomical sex of their birth, and want to live and dress as the other sex. 1 0 
Intersexed individuals, or in tersexuals , (traditionally known as hermaph-
rodites) have the physical characteristics of both sexes, 11 and may be di-
Michel Foucault, Introduction, in HERCULE BARBIN: BEING THE RECENTLY DISCOVERED 
MEMOIRS OF A NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH HERMAPHRODITE vii (Richard McDougall, 
trans., 1980) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, HERCULE BARBIN]. 
5. HENRY GRAY, ANATOMY OF THE HUMAN BODY 1366 (30th ed. 1985). 
6. See generally GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS, supra note 3. 
7. Richard Green, Spelling "Relief" for Transsexuals: Employment Discrimination 
and the Cn'teria of Sex, 4 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 125, 127 (1985). 
8. Id. Whisner, too, notes that '''transvestism' is often used more narrowly to refer 
only to cross-dressing for the purpose of sexual arousal." Mary Whisner, Note, Gender-
Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 73, 97 n.137 
(1982). 
9. See generally GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS, supra note 3. 
10. Specifically, "transsexual ism is 'behaviorally, the act of living and passing in the 
role of the opposite sex, before or after having attained hormonal, surgical, and legal sex 
reassignment; psychically, the condition of people who have the conviction that they be-
long to the opposite sex and are driven by a compulsion to have the body, appearance, and 
social status of the opposite sex. '" Edward S. David, Note, The Law and Transsexualism: 
A Faltering Response to a Conceptual Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REv. 288 n.l (1975) (quoting 
1. MONEY & A. EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN: BOY & GIRL 291 (1972». 
11. David, supra note 10, at 291. The term "hermaphrodite" is derived from Greek 
mythology: "Hermaphroditus, the son of Hermes and Aphrodite, was a beautiful young 
man, so fetching that the nymph of the fountain of Salmacis fell desperately in love and 
begged the gods to merge her body with his forever. They granted the nymph her wish, 
forming a being half-man, half-woman." Natalie Angier, Hermaphrodites Struggle to Find 
Identity in Bodies with Ambiguous Genitalia; Newly Formed Group Prefers to be Known 
as Intersexuals, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Feb. 4, 1996, at 08. 
Intersexed individuals are now advocating for the descriptive label "intersexual" 
rather than hermaphrodite. Id. See also Anne Fausto-Sterling, Having It All: The Unruly 
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vided into three subgroups: those with one testis and one ovary, those with 
testes and some aspects of female genitalia, but not ovaries, and those with 
ovaries and some aspects of male genitalia, but no testes. 12 Androgyny in-
volves a blending of gender traits or signifiers, rather than of sexual organs, 
to create an ambiguous identity which is not overtly male or female. 13 
Lastly, transgender is an umbrella term that encompasses transvestites, 
cross-dressers, transsexuals, intersexuals, androgynes,14 and those who 
simply mix and match elements of "male" and "female" sex/gender identi-
ties. I5 
Part I provides a context for the discussion. After a brief excursion into 
colonial law, I will first address the medical establishment's contribution to 
the persecution of transgendered people. In particular, I will consider the 
American Psychiatric Association's determination that deviation from ex-
pected gender identity indicates mental pathology. I will then turn to the le-
gal system's treatment of transgendered people, particularly cross-dressers. 
Part II explores the apparent social need for clear cut boundaries between 
sexes, and explains the futility of attempting to establish such rigid demar-
cations. I will survey recent social attacks against transgendered people, and 
then explore and criticize the medical establishment's role in the determina-
tion of sex. I will also consider the relative benefits of having medicine ver-
sus the law make the determination of sex. Part III briefly critiques essen-
tialist discussions of sex and gender, and reveals the limitations of even 
antiessentialist arguments when used in this context. Finally, in Part IV, I 
will argue that given the instability of sex and the fluidity of gender, laws 
criminalizing cross-dressing and/or "passing" as the opposite gender are an 
unjustifiable oppression oftransgendered people. 
Bodies of /ntersexuals Blur the Great Divide of a Two-Sex Society, Challenging a System 
that has Trouble Dealing With Even Supposedly 'Normal Sex, , VANCOUVER SUN, May 22, 
1993, at CIO (noting that "medicine uses the term 'intersex' as a catch-all for three major 
subgroups with some mixture of male and female characteristics"--hermaphrodites, male 
pseudo-hermaphrodites, and female pseudo-hermaphrodites). This Note will therefore re-
fer to them as intersexuals. 
12. Ruth Colker, Bi: Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Disability, 56 OHIO ST. 
L.J. I n.147 (1995) (citing Anne Fausto-Sterling, How Many Sexes Are There? N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at A29). 
13. /d. at 44. 
14. /d. at 44 n.3. 
15. The colloquial term "gender-fuck" might best describe this latter construction of 
identity. "In gender-fuck, people express aspects of both genders at once, like a man in an 
evening gown cut low so you can see his chest hair ... , or a woman exposing her cleavage 
in a tuxedo." DOSSIE EASTON & CATHERINE A. LIZST, THE BOTTOMING BOOK: OR, How TO 
GET TERRIBLE THINGS DoNE TO You BY WONDERFUL PEOPLE 93 (1995). 
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I. BACKGROUND-THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT 
A. THE CASE OF THOMAS(INE) HALL-A LESSON FROM THE PAST 
Archival minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia 
reveal an interesting case from 1629.16 An English-born person, christened 
Thomasine Hall, had spent childhood dressed as a girl. At age twelve, s/he 
was sent to an aunt in London, who dressed her/him as a boy, Thomas. S/he 
served as a soldier for a few years, dressed as a man, after which s/he 
donned women's apparel, making bone lace and doing other needlework. 
When s/he was twenty, Thomas(ine) dressed as a man and came to the Vir-
ginia colony, where s/he switched her/his clothing regularly. S/he came to 
the attention of the authorities after an alleged sexual encounter with a 
plantation owner's maid. When queried by the owner about his/her sex, s/he 
answered that s/he was both a man and a woman. An initial forcible exami-
nation by the owner and another man revealed Thomas(ine) to have a penis. 
At a subsequent examination by a small band of women and men, s/he again 
asserted that she was both, explaining that "hee had not the use of the mans 
parte . .. was a peece of fleshe growing at the . . . belly as bigg as the topp 
of his little finger [ an] inch longe . . . ." S/he was ordered by the authorities 
to be put into women's apparel. Unsatisfied, the band accosted him/her 
again the following week, and asked "if that were all hee had to which hee 
answered I have a peece of a hole . ... " Ultimately, the General Court or-
dered it to be published in the plantation where s/he lived "that hee is a man 
and a woeman." It further ordered himlher to dress in men's clothing, "only 
his head to bee attired in a Coyfe and Croscloth with an Apron before 
him .... " 
Hall's case is significant in its revelation of the judicial system's initially 
fluid approach to the question of gender and sex. When confronted by an 
ambiguous person, the court declared her/him to be both woman and man, 
decreeing that s/he go about dressed in a mixture of masculine and feminine 
clothing. 17 Unfortunately, this alternative seventeenth-century approach has 
not survived. As will be seen, in modern times both medicine and law ap-
pear determined to force individuals into distinct but arbitrary categories. 
16. Exaicons taken before John Pott Esq gouernor [sic} the 25th day of March AO, in 
MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL AND GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA, 1622-1632, 1670-
1676, WITH NOTES AND EXCERPTS FROM ORIGINAL COUNCIL AND GENERAL COURT RECORDS, 
INTO 1683, Now loST 194-95 (H.R. McIlwaine ed., 1924). The rest of this section will 
refer, without citations, to this text. 
17. The decision is not without fault. Problematic elements are discussed infra text 
following note 167. 
Winter 1997] SHAPE-SHIFTERS & MASQUERADERS 199 
B. THE MODERN APPROACH: THEPSYCHIATRICATTACK18 
The medical establishment has contributed greatly to the discussion of 
gender deviance. 19 In fact, it created the very notion that gender noncon-
formity is a pathology. Although homosexuality was removed by the 
American Psychiatric Association's (APA) list of behavioral pathologies in 
1973, the Association eight years later promulgated a new category called 
"gender identity dysphoria" (GID).20 The APA uses this new diagnosis in 
the same way it had used homosexuality: to pathologize deviance from ex-
pected gender or sex norms.21 Two c~iteria are used to diagnose GID: 1) a 
"strong and persistent cross-gender identification (not merely a desire for 
any perceived cultural advantages of being the other sex)," and 2) a 
"persistent discomfort about one's assigned sex or a sense of inappropriate-
ness in the gender role of that sex. "22 
The AP A's diagnostic manual explains that GID is manifested in girls 
by a preference for, inter alia, traditional boys' clothing and short hair, 
powerful male figures such as Batman or Superman as their fantasy heroes, 
and little interest in feminine dress-up or role-play. In boys, the symptoms 
are predictably the opposite: playing house, drawing pictures of beautiful 
girls and princesses, and playing with dolls.23 Moreover, afflicted boys 
have little interest in cars and trucks or rough and tumble play, and may in-
sist on sitting to urinate.24 Adults with GID are typically preoccupied with 
their wish to live as a member of the opposite sex, and adopt the dress, be-
havior and mannerisms of that sex.25 Individuals displaying GID character-
istics have been institutionalized.26 
18. For the analysis of the APA attack, I am indebted to National Center for Lesbian 
Rights staff attorney Shannon Minter and his unpublished manuscript, From 
"Homosexuality" to "Gender Identity Disorder": How Psychiatry Pathologizes Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth (on file with author). 
19. The 19th century sexologists' construction of a medical "sexual identity," ultimately 
laid the groundwork for the development of "gender deviance." For an excellent discus-
sion of the early medical establishment's role in the formation of the conceptual categories 
of sex/gender, see generally JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: MEANINGS, 
MYTHS AND MODERN SEXUALITIES (1985). 
20. Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Con-
jlation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Soci-
ety, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1, 84 (1995). 
21. Id. at 85. 
22. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS, FOURTH EDITION 532-33, 537 (1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. 
23. Id. at 533 . 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. For a discussion of individuals institutionalized in the Midwest and Utah because of 
their perceived deviance from gender norms, see Carole Rafferty, Homosexuality or 
"Disorder"? It's a Fine Line that Psychiatrists Cross Too Often, Many Gays Say, CHI. 
TRIB., Aug. 1, 1995, at Tempo 1. See also Daphne Scholinski, 1 Was Never Meant to Sur-
vive, NCLR NEWSLETTER (Nat'l Ctr. for Lesbian Rts., S.F., Cal.), Spring 1996, at 11 (on 
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After creating the notion of pathologic gender deviance, the AP A states 
that GID "can be distinguished from simple nonconformity to stereotypical 
sex role behavior by the extent and pervasiveness of the cross-gender 
wishes."27 It explains that GID is not meant to describe 
"tomboyishness" in girls or "sissyish" behavior in boys. Rather, it 
represents a profound disturbance of the individual's sense of iden-
tity with regard to maleness or femaleness. Behavior in children 
that merely does not fit the cultural stereotype of masculinity or 
femininity should not be given the diagnosis unless the full syn-
drome is present, including marked distress or impairment.28 
While this may seem to be a laudable distinction, it offers little practical 
guidance. When does "simple nonconformity to stereotypical sex role be-
havior" cross over into "a profound disturbance" requiring institutionaliza-
tion? Is (or should) the shift into pathology be based on community stan-
dards of acceptable deviance? Would a person who is psychologically 
healthy by San Francisco, California, standards be pathologically deviant in 
Tucson, Arizona?29 
file with author). 
Discussing institutionalization of the mad/unreasonable, Foucault notes that it might 
be justified insofar as "[t]he madman's [sic] body [is] regarded as the visible and solid 
presence of his [sic] disease." MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY 
OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON 159 (1965) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND 
CIVILIZATION]' He traces the interconnections between medicine, morality, and the coer-
cion of those perceived to be unreasonable: 
It is important, perhaps decisive for the place madness was to occupy in 
modern culture, that homo medicus was not called into the world of con-
finement as an arbiter, to divide what was crime from madness, what was 
evil from what was illness, but rather as a guardian, to protect others from 
the vague danger that exuded through the walls of confinement. 
ld. at 205. Medicine's role was thus to police the unreasonable, using its coercive power 
to cordon off the nominally mad for the safety of the allegedly sane masses. 
Foucault asserts elsewhere that "the role of the psychiatrist in penal matters" is "to 
suggest a prescription for what might be called [the patient's] 'medico-juridical treat-
ment. '" MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 22 (1977). 
In the present context, institutionalizing the "GID afflicted" blurs the line between medi-
cine and law, letting psychiatrists act as prison wardens in order to administer their dra-
conian "medico-juridical treatment." It must be kept in mind that, ultimately, 
"[c]onfinement, that massive phenomenon, ... is a 'police' matter." FOUCAULT, MADNESS 
AND CIVILIZATION, at 46. Policing the sick is arguably a troubling notion at best. 
27. DSM-IV, supra note 22, at 536 (emphasis in original). 
28. Id. 
29. It would be frightening to have sanity/mental health contingent on community stan-
dards. One moral philosopher, discussing "the tension between individual moral respon-
sibility and obedience to collective norms," suggests that 
[w]e must ... understand the meaning of "wrong," "inadequate," and 
"irrational" in the context of an ethical community defined by certain val-
ues, values that are intersubjective because they are held by the members of 
that community. If you are member of that community, fellow members 
can denounce your values as deviant and, conversely, you can defend your 
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This discussion is not meant to suggest that the concept of GID is prob-
lematic per se, or that the GID diagnosis should be removed from the DSM-
IV. There are individuals, such as pre-operative transsexuals, who truly are 
gender dysphoric: biological women who believe they are men (or vice 
versa), and who wish to undergo hormone therapy and perhaps even sex re-
assignment surgery to resolve the dissonance between their gender identity 
and sexual anatomy.30 Without the diagnosis, hormones or sex reassign-
ment surgery would be difficult to obtain, for insurance coverage would be 
unlikely.31 Rather than protecting transgendered individuals who do not 
suffer from gender identity dysphoria by completely eliminating the GID di-
agnosis, a more reasonable approach would be to simply hold the medical 
establishment accountable for its (mis)use of its diagnostic power. 
Ultimately, the question "What constitutes (true) gender deviance?" 
raised by the GID diagnosis is overshadowed by the threshold questions 
"What is gender?" and "What is biological sex?" After a survey of the legal 
system's response to gender deviance, the discussion will turn to these fun-
damental questions. 
C. THE MODERN APPROACH: THE LEGAL ATTACK 
1. Cross-Dressing - Generally 
The psychiatric establishment is not alone in its discomfort with those 
who do not or cannot act in ways thought to be appropriate for their sex. 
Thousands of years ago, the patriarchal authors of the Old Testament de-
creed that "[a] woman shall not wear anything that pertains to a man, nor 
shall a man put on a woman's garment; for whoever does these things is an 
abomination to the Lord your God. "32 
The legal system in this country has generally adhered to the spirit of 
this decree. Among the oldest of the modern cases on point are two New 
York cases from the nineteen-sixties: People v. Archibald33 and People v. 
Gillespie.34 Both involved convictions of male cross-dressers under a now-
values, all under community standards. 
Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REv. 853, 961 
(1992) (emphasis added). In the GID context, there is arguably an inherent danger in 
basing psychiatric diagnoses on community standards. Conservatives could, for example, 
simply "clean up" their communities by relegating sexual progressives or gender dissidents 
to mental institutions. 
30. See, e.g., G.B. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555, 556 (1978) (recognizing that trans-
sexual ism "is a serious problem of gender role disorientation," and that the plaintiff's sex 
reassignment surgery could not be characterized as mere cosmetic surgery). 
31. See, e.g., Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that state 
cannot deny Medicaid coverage for sex reassignment surgery, given that surgery is the only 
medical treatment available to solve the problems of a true transsexual). 
32. Deuteronomy, 22:5 (Revised Standard). 
33. 296 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1968). 
34. 202 N.E.2d 565, 254 N. Y.S.2d 121 (1964). Given that Gillespie is a very terse 
opinion, I will not attempt a detailed discussion of its jurisprudence. 
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superseded statute banning vagrancy. 35 The statute considered a vagrant 
any person whose face was "painted, discolored, covered or concealed, or 
being otherwise disguised, in a manner calculated to prevent his [sic] being 
identified.,,36 The law originally was enacted in 1845 in response to mur-
ders of law enforcement agents by Hudson Valley farmers, who killed the 
agents as they attempted to serve writs on the farmers. As part of their 
guerrilla strategies during these so-called Anti-Rent Riots, the farmers had 
concealed their identities by disguising themselves as Indian women, wearing 
calico dresses.37 Far from being the sort of dangerous writ-evading farmer 
whose behavior the statute had been enacted to regulate, defendant Ar-
chibald was merely standing in drag on a New York City subway platform, 
on his way home from a masquerade party, when he was arrested for cross-
dressing.38 
Elizabeth Kennedy and Madeline Davis, in their history of a lesbian 
community in 1940s and '50s Buffalo, N.Y., note that many women re-
ported being harassed under a quasi-legal requirement that women at all 
times wear two or three articles of female clothing.39 One interviewee de-
scribed at length her harassment for gender deviance: 
I've had police walk up to me and say, "Get out of the car." I'm 
drivin. ' They say get out of the car; and I get out. And they say, 
"What kind of shoes you got on? You got on men's shoes?" And I 
say, "No, I got on women's shoes." I got on some basket-weave 
women's shoes. And he say, "Well, you damn lucky." 'Cause eve-
rything else I had on were men's--shirts, pants. At that time when 
they pick you up, if you didn't have two garments that belong to a 
woman you could go to jail . . . and the same thing with a 
man . . " They call it male impersonation or female impersona-
tion and they'd take you downtown. It would really just be an in-
convenience . . .. It would give them the opportunity to whack the 
shit out ofyou.40 
35. N.Y. CODE CRlM. PROC. § 887(7)(vagrancy) (1845), superseded by N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 240.35 (loitering) (McKinney 1967). 
36. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 887(7) (1845). 
37. 296 N.Y.S.2d at 837 (Markowitz, J., dissenting). 
38. !d. In response to Archibald and Gillespie, the NY ordinance was modified to ex-
clude masqueraders. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35 (McKinney 1967). 
39. ELIZABETHLAPOVSKY KENNEDY & MADELINE D. DAVIS, BOOTS OF LEATHER, SLIPPERS 
OF GOLD: THE HISTORY OF A LESBIAN COMMUNITY 180 (1993). Kennedy and Davis admit 
they have been unable to find such a New York State law, aside from the outdated va-
grancy statute cited in Archibald and Gillespie. Id. at 411 n.29. They submit that, 
"[a]ccording to Professor Nan Hunter of the Brooklyn College of Law School, no such law 
exists (personal communication, January 1992). It is her guess that a judge in a particular 
case made a ruling that two or three pieces of clothing of the 'correct' sex negated male or 
female impersonation and that set a precedent used by law enforcement agencies." Id. 
40. !d. at 1 80 (emphasis added). 
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The homophobic harassment of cross-dressing women by law enforce-
ment officers is not merely a relic of times past. As recently as twenty years 
ago, a Texas court found female cross-dressing to be relevant evidence of, 
among other things, a murderous motive. In Perez v. State of Texas, a 
woman appealed a conviction for murdering her alleged lesbian lover.41 The 
Perez Court considered whether evidence of the existence of an "illicit rela-
tionship" between two women could be introduced as part of the relevant 
facts and circumstances surrounding the killing. 42 This evidence included 
testimony by the deceased's brother-in-law that the defendant, Maria Perez, 
had short hair and dressed like a man, and that "she always takes a man's 
place."43 He further opined that Perez and his sister-in-law had lived to-
gether "like a man and woman would."44 
As part of her defense, Perez denied being a lesbian, and explained that, 
as a truck farmer, her choice of male clothing was better suited for her 
work.45 Nonetheless, the court found the clothing testimony relevant to the 
existence of a relationship between the two women.46 It also held the photo 
"clearly admissible ... as it shows motive as well as being additional proof 
that the appellant, through the years, did not dress and look as she did at the 
time of trial."4 7 It noted that Perez wore women's clothing and had long 
hair during the tria1.48 
Notably absent from the decision was an explanation of why short hair 
and pants would be probative of a relationship between Perez and the de-
ceased. The unspoken assumption here is that lesbians wear pants and have 
short hair. Such an assumption is underinclusive, as heterosexual women 
also wear pants49 and may have short hair.50 These traits are therefore not 
defmitive indicia of sexual orientation. 51 Like the Perez court, the police in 
4l. Perez v. State of Texas, 491 S.W.2d 672 (1973). 
42. Id. at 673. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 675. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. (emphasis added). 
48. Id. at 675 n.l. 
49. Pat Morgan, Wardrobe Workshop: Women Will be Men-Man is Alluring, Mysteri-
ous, and Incredibly Sexy. Not to Mention Practical, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 21, 1992, at E4 
("The beauty of this fall's menswear look lies in the contradiction ofa feminine woman in 
masculine clothes."). 
50. '''Long hair doesn't have a style,' said [Joseph] Kendell, recently rated the No. I 
hair stylist in Los Angeles. 'Long hair is just long hair and it can take attention away from 
your clothes. '" Valli Herman, Hair Today, Gone Tomorrow - But That's the Style, L.A. 
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 29, 1991, at L7. Moreover, "[s]ome of the world's sexiest women have 
short hair, and look better with it. Can you imagine Jamie Lee Curtis, Dolores O'Riordan 
(The Cranberries), Isabella Rossellini, Linda Evangelista or the Princess of Wales with 
long hair?" Melanie Rickey, Try Me, INDEPENDENT (London) June 4, 1996, at 13. 
51. Long hair and skirts are not the exclusive province of heterosexual women. Accord-
ing to one account of lesbians in Buffalo, N. Y., in the 1940s and 1950s, "ferns", or femi-
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Buffalo endorsed these erroneous gendered clothing norms in their harass-
ment of lesbians for failure to wear two or three items of "feminine" cloth-
ing. 
Gay male sex workers dressing as women have at times found them-
selves targeted by statutes banning cross-dressing generally. 52 In City of 
Cincinnati v. Adams,53 for example, the court addressed the following mu-
nicipal code provision: 
No person within the city of Cincinnati shall appear in a dress or 
costume not customarily worn by his or her sex, or in a disguise 
when such dress, apparel, or disguise is worn with the intent of 
committing any indecent or immoral act or of violating any ordi-
nance of the city of Cincinnati or law of the state of Ohio. 54 
The sex worker defendant, Adams, argued that his cross-dressing was 
protected expression under the First Amendment. 55 The court rejected this 
argument, finding no evidence that his choice of attire represented a philoso-
phyor idea1.56 Although noting that cross-dressing can be regulated "when 
it is associated with criminal misconduct and bears a reasonable relation to 
the public health, safety, morals, and welfare," the court ultimately found 
the ordinance unconstitutionally vague and violative of Adams' Fourteenth 
nine lesbians, wore skirts in the 1940s, with only some pants coming into fashion for ferns 
in the 1950s. KENNEDY & DAVIS, supra note 39, at 156, 162. Even in the 1950s, however, 
African-American ferns wore almost exclusively skirts and dresses. Id. at 164. Short hair 
was certainly not a fern trait: one fern related that "I had long hair but I wore it up .... It 
was usually up in a bun or a french twist or just with a ribbon." Id. at 156. 
52. The targeted effect on both gay men and lesbians is not accidental: "Lawenforce-
ment authorities often devote great attention to the enforcement of public sex and loitering 
laws against same-sex sexual conduct and solicitation. Gay men and lesbians also have 
been subjected to unprovoked violence by police officers, as well as other forms of police 
harassment." Note, Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1542 (1989). . 
Such legal and illegal use of state force to regulate morality is deeply implicated in 
the legal control of gender deviance. In the sex work context, the moral issue of Judeo-
Christian condemnation of prostitution ("Do not profane your daughter by making her a 
harlot, lest the land fall into harlotry and the land become full of wickedness." Leviticus, 
19:29 (Revised Standard)) is obvious; in the more "innocent" case of high schoolers cross 
dressing at a prom, discussed infra note 58 and accompanying text, the moral connection is 
more tenuous, hence the affront arguably more readily recognizable. Discussing the coer-
cive regulation of morality, Foucault notes that "we see inscribed in the institutions of ab-
solute monarchy ... the ... idea that virtue, too, is an affair of the state, that decrees can 
be published to make it flourish, that an authority can be established to make sure it is re-
spected. " FOUCAULT, MADNESS & CIVILIZATION, supra note 26, at 61. 
53. 330 N.E.2d 463 (Ohio 1974). 
54. CINCINNATI, Omo, MUN. CODE § 909-5 (emphasis added). The focus on indecency 
and immorality sets this code apart from the ordinances in Wilson and McConn, infra notes 
71, 73 and accompanying text, which were amoral, blanket prohibitions against gender 
role deviance. 
55. 330 N.E.2d. at 464. 
56. Id. at 465. 
. 1i&"8 With 
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Amendment right to due process. 57 
In a case involving a more innocuous type of cross dressing than the 
charged issues of gay male sex work or lesbian murder, an Ohio high school 
refused to allow two of its students to cross-dress at their prom. 58 The boy 
appeared wearing a dress, a fur cape, earrings, stockings, and high heels; his 
sister wore a black tuxedo and men's shoes.59 Upon refusing the principal's 
request to leave, they were escorted from the ballroom by police.60 In court, 
the students asserted that the school's refusal to allow their cross-dressing 
violated the Equal Protection Clause, since female students were permitted 
to wear dresses and male students to wear tuxedos. Granting summary 
judgment against the students' civil rights action, the district court found 
both that the school's dress code was "reasonably related to the valid educa-
tional purposes of teaching community values and maintaining school dis-
cipline," and that the school's actions did not violate any rights the students 
might have under the First Amendment. 61 In terms of the Equal Protection 
challenge, the court decreed that "[t]he school dress code does not differen-
tiate based on sex. [It] requires all students to dress in conformity with the 
accepted standards of the community. "62 In so holding, the court refused to 
question the oppressively gendered nature of the community standards. 
The court's decision in Harper did not occur in a historical vacuum. 
Fourteen years earlier, the Idaho Supreme Court invalidated an Idaho school 
district's dress code that barred female students from wearing pants.63 The 
regulation declared that "[a]ny type of clothing or attire which attracts un-
due attention to the wearer and thus causes a disturbance in the school or in 
the classroom is not acceptable. Girls are expected to wear dresses or skirts 
which are not more than two inches above the knee . . . ."64 The school 
Board of Trustees construed the "dresses or skirts" section to mean only 
those items were allowed, which in effect barred female students from 
wearing pants.65 
In justifying this restriction, the school board alleged that "the wearing 
of culottes, slacks or pantsuits by female students" results in 
(1) a detrimental effect on the morals of the students attending the 
57. Id. (emphasis added). The court held unconstitutionally vague both the phrase "not 
customarily worn," and the statutory element of intent to commit any "indecent" or 
"immoral" act. Id. at 465-66. 
58. Harper v. Edgewood Bd. ofEduc., 655 F. Supp. 1353 (S.D. Ohio 1987). 
59. Id. at 1354. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 1355 (emphasis added). The court also rejected the argument that the stu-
dents' removal by police had violated their right to due process. Id. 
62. Id. at 1356. 
63. Johnson v. Joint School District No. 60, Bringham County, 508 P.2d 547 (Idaho 
1973). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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school and upon the educational process; 
(2) unsafe conditions and safety hazards at the schools; 
(3) insubordination, rebelliousness and lack of respect for authority; 
(4) loss of respect for, and damage to, school property; 
(5) a detrimental effect upon the general attitude of the students; 
(6) an increased amount of physical contact and familiarity between 
boys and girls in school surroundings; 
(7) loss of standards of conduct; and 
(8) a detrimental effect on emotional makeup and problems in the 
school district. 66 
Given the Board's failure to substantiate any of these outlandish claims, 
the court upheld the trial court's finding that female students in pants had 
not disrupted the school's disciple or instructional effectiveness, and did not 
have a detrimental effect on the safety or morals of their fellow students.67 
The record is silent on the Board's justification for its stated fearr-it pro-
vided no examples of pants creating unsafe conditions or safety hazards, or 
causing loss of respect for, or damage to, school property. Whisner notes 
that "gender differentiation was obviously important to this school district. 
It sensed social chaos resulting from a breakdown in gender distinction by 
dress; girls in pants were threatening."68 It is unclear why the Board 
thought that women in anything but skirts or dresses would undermine the 
very fabric (so to speak) of school society. What is clear is the perceived 
threat to the all-male69 Board in response to women wearing clothing tradi-
tionally worn only by men.70 
66. Id. at 548. 
67. Id. 
68. Whisner, supra note 8, at 103. 
69. During the 1971-72 school year, the Board was comprised of Jack Draney (chair), 
Vance Barnett, Dale Jolley, Eugene Humphries, and Bob Kirkham. Letter to author from 
Trish Dixon, Secretary to Charles 1. Shackett, Superintendent of Schools, Shelley Jt. 
School District No. 60 (July 22, 1996) (on file with author). 
70. One commentator notes that 
[i]n a patriarchal, sexist society, power is controlled by men, and women 
are considered biologically and socially inferior. This rigid social order is 
reflected in sex specific rules for gender behavior. Gender expectations in 
contemporary American society include an implicit value assumption: 
whatever males do is "masculine," normal, and therefore good, whatever 
women do is "feminine" and intrinsically inferior. 
Meredith Gould, Sex, Gender, and the Need for Legal Clarity: The Case for Transsexual-
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2. Cross Dressing - Transsexuals 
The preceding cases reveal the legal system's general aversion to and 
discomfort with cross-dressers. Courts have, however, allowed some indi-
viduals to cross-dress so long as they were undergoing therapy in prepara-
tion for sex reassignment surgery. One such case, City of Chicago v. Wi/-
son,71 concerned a statute prohibiting any person from appearing "in a 
public place . . . in a dress not belonging to his or her sex, with intent to 
conceal his or her sex. "72 The court held that, as applied to the defendants, 
preoperative transsexuals under a doctor's care, the ordinance was an un-
constitutional infringement of their liberty interests. 73 In the course of its 
analysis, the court considered Chicago's arguments for the total ban on 
cross-dressing in public: 
1) to protect citizens from being misled or defrauded; 
2) to aid in the description and detection of criminals; 
3) to prevent crimes in washrooms; and 
4) to prevent inherently antisocial conduct which is contrary to 
the accepted norms of our society. 74 
The fIrst and fourth criteria are particularly interesting. The combined 
notion that anyone not conforming to the accepted gender norms of society 
must be perpetrating an actionable fraud is telling of society's fear of and 
discomfort with the disruption of rigid behavioral categories. Furthermore, 
it reveals the normative nature of the strict male/female sexual binary within 
which the conventional gender discourse is set. This sexual binarism will be 
addressed more fully below. 
Although at times magnanimously allowing cross-dressing by trans-
sexuals, courts have fallen far short of actually protecting such behavior 
from discrimination. Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held that Ti-
tle VII does not protect transsexuals from employment discrimination. In 
ism, 13 VAL. U. L. REv. 423, 431 (1979). Given that men control this society (implicitly 
at the expense of women's empowennent), it stands to reason that men would jealously 
guard not only their power but the cultural signifiers of that power. Pants being tradi-
tionally "male," it is not surprising that the male legal establishment would try to take 
steps to ensure that pants would be socially off-limits to women. 
71. 389 N.E.2d 522, 523 (Ill. 1978). 
72. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 192-8 (emphasis added). 
73. 389 N.E.2d at 525. In Doe I v. McConn, 489 F.Supp. 76, 79 (S.D. Tex. 1980), a 
federal court presented with a statute similar to the one in Wilson, followed Wilson in 
holding the statute unconstitutional as applied to the defendants. The statute in McConn, 
HOUSTON, TEX., CODE ORDINANCES § 28-42.4 (1972), read: "It shall be unlawful for any 
person to appear on any public street, sidewalk, alley, or other public thoroughfare dressed 
with the designed intent to disguise his or her true sex as that of the opposite sex." Id. 
74. 389 N.E.2d at 524 (emphasis added). 
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Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, an airline pilot who joined Eastern Airlines as a 
biological man subsequently underwent sex reassignment surgery; she was 
then fIred for '''no reason other than the fact that she ceased being a male 
and became a female. "'75 Finding no statutory support in Title VII for 
transsexuals, the Seventh Circuit overturned a progressive district court de-
cision holding that the statute's remedial purposes should be construed lib-
erally enough to encompass sexual identity. 76 In reaching that decision, 
District Court Judge Grady had determined, inter alia, that "it is a question 
of one's own self-perception. How does one perceive oneself in terms of 
maleness or femaleness? It is also a social matter: How does society per-
ceive the individual?"77 While sympathetic to the obvious justice of Judge 
Grady's decision, the Seventh Circuit overturned his ruling on jurisdictional 
grounds.78 In doing so, it was following a Ninth Circuit decision, Holloway 
v. Arthur Andersen and Co. 79 
In Holloway, the court addressed the fIring of a pre-operative male-to-
female transsexual soon after she announced her intention to undergo sex re-
assignment surgery. 80 Noting that the district court had not reached the 
merits of the case, the appellate court limited itself to the question of 
whether Title VII allowed an employee to be discharged for initiating the 
process of sex transformation. 81 Reading the statute narrowly, the court 
75. 742 F.2d 1081, 1082-83 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985) 
(quoting the opening argument of Ulane's counsel). Ulane's qualifications were not dis-
puted: she had "a record of combat missions in Vietnam for which [she] received an Air 
Medal with eight clusters." Id. at 1082. At Eastern, she "progressed from Second to First 
Officer, and also served as flight instructor, logging over 8,000 flight hours." Id. at 1082-
83. Both the appellate and lower court opinions are discussed in D. Douglas Cotton, Note, 
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines: Title VII and Transsexualism, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1037 (1986). 
76. Id. at 1084, overturning Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ill. 
1983). 
77. Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 825. 
78. The court stated that "[w]hile we do not condone discrimination in any form, we are 
constrained to hold that Title VII does not protect transsexuals, and that the district court's 
order on this count therefore must be reversed for lack of jurisdiction." 742 F.2d at 1084 
(footnote omitted). 
79. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977), cited in Ulane, 581 F. Supp. 821, passim. 
80. Id. at 661. 
81. Id. In terms of the merits, the court stated that the supervisor's 
affidavit detailed many of the personnel problems created by appellant's 
transitional appearance (red lipstick and nail polish, hairstyle, jewelry and 
clothing), his [sic] use of the men's room and his [sic] behavior at social 
functions. We note that the district court failed to consider the facts when 
making its determination, even though [the supervisor] stated that Hollo-
way was not terminated because of transsexualism, "but because the dress, 
appearance and manner he {sic] was affecting were such that it was very 
disruptive and embarrassing to all concerned." 
Id. at 661 n.1 (quoting an affidavit by Holloway's supervisor, Marion Passard) (emphasis 
added). The termination was thus in effect a "heckler's veto": coercion of the individual 
to accommodate the discomfort of intolerant others. 
4 
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found "sex" to not encompass transsexualism.82 The dissenting opinion 
opted for a less restrictive reading of the law. Conceding that Congress had 
"probably never contemplated that Title VII would apply to transsexuals," 
the dissenting judge nonetheless asserted that he "would not limit the right to 
claim discrimination to those who were born into the victim class .... The 
relevant fact is that she was, on the day she was ftred, a purported fe-
male."83 
While praiseworthy for recognizing and respecting Holloway's tempo-
rally shifting sexual identity, the dissent implicitly raised a deceptively sim-
ple question that underlies every transsexual case and many transgendered 
cases generally: How do we determine what sex a person is at any given 
point in time? The following section will address this question. 
II. THE "NEED" FOR GENDER CLARITY 
A. (ANTI) SOCIAL REACTION AND HOSTILITY 
my spirit is too ancient to understand the separation of 
soul & gender/ my love is too delicate to have thrown 
back on my face84 
The medical and legal establishments' intolerance of gender deviance 
has not persisted in a vacuum. Individual members of society have been 
forthcoming in their own violent expressions of fear and hatred of those who 
blur gender boundaries. Discussing the social control of erotic sexuality, 
Gayle Rubin notes that "[s]ex law is not a perfect reflection of the prevailing 
moral evaluations of sexual conduct. Erotic sexual variation per se is more 
speciftcally policed by mental-health professionals, popular ideology, and 
extra-legal social practice. "85 The same applies to gender variation. A 
handful of recent cases, reflecting popular gender ideology and the extra-
legal social practices used to punish gender deviants, reveal the "degree of 
anger and social opprobrium that can be unleashed when a gender outlaw's 
fraud is revealed to the public."86 
82. Id. at 663 (Goodwin, J., dissenting). 
83. Id. at 664. The dissent further stated, a bit glibly, that "this is a case of a person 
completing surgically that part of nature's handiwork which apparently was left incomplete 
somewhere along the line." Id. 
84. NTOZAKE SHANGE, FOR COLORED GIRLS WHO HAVE CONSIDERED SUICIDE WHEN THE 
RAINBow IS ENUF - A CHOREOPOEM 45 (1977). 
85. Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, 
in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 288 (Carole Vance ed., 
1984). 
86. Franke, supra note 3, at 22. Foucault notes: 
if nature, through its fantasies or accidents, might "deceive" the observer 
and hide the true sex for a time, individuals might also very well be sus-
pected of dissembling their inmost knowledge of their true sex and of 
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In 1995, Debbie Forte, a Massachusetts pre-operative transsexual, was 
stabbed to death by a new lover who flew into a murderous rage upon dis-
covering that Forte was biologically male.87 Two years earlier, a 21-year-
old Nebraskan known as Brandon Teena (or Teena Brandon), who identified 
as a male although biologically female, suffered a similar fate. Two of his 
friends, suspicious of the truth of his biological sexual identity, accosted him 
during a Christmas Eve party: pinning his arms behind him in a bathroom, 
they pulled down his pants and forced his girlfriend to look and verify that 
he had a vagina.88 After the party, the two erstwhile friends savagely beat 
him, forced him into a car, and drove him to a deserted parking lot outside of 
town, where they took turns raping him.89 A week later, they drove to his 
home, an isolated farmhouse, and shot and stabbed him to death before 
shooting and killing the two witnesses.90 Only the infant son of one of the 
witnesses was spared.91 
These cases reveal the visceral, violent reaction some people have 
against those who fail to conform to traditional sex/gender roles and appear-
ances. Others have reacted less violently but no less offensively. Sean 
O'Neill (born Sharon Clark), a biological female identifying as male, had 
numerous underage girlfriends during his late teens.92 In 1995, after the 
girlfriends' parents suspected that he had a vagina rather than a penis, he 
was charged with eleven felony counts of sexual assault, criminal imper-
sonation of the opposite gender, and sexual assault on a child. 93 He later 
pled guilty to a single count of sexual assault. 94 This case "may be the first 
profiting from certain anatomical oddities in order to make use of their 
bodies as if they belonged to the other sex. In short, the phantasmagorias 
of nature might be of service to licentious behavior, hence the moral inter-
est that inhered in the medical diagnosis of the true sex. 
FOUCAULT, HERCULE BARBIN, supra note 4, at ix. Perhaps it is "moral" outrage at the gen-
der deception that explains the violence of the cases discussed immediately below. 
87. Bill Hutchinson, DA Says New Lover Killed Man He Thought Was a She, BOSTON 
HERALD, June 3, 1995, at 006. 
88. Julie Wheelwright, The Boyfriend: "He Was a Lot of Girls' Dream Guy, " Accord-
ing to a Friend. There Was Just One Problem: He Wasn't a Guy, GUARDIAN (London), 
Feb. 20, 1996, at T006. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. One of the murderers testified at trial that, soon after the rape, the two had 
planned to murder Brandon, with part of the plan involving "chopping off his hands and 
head to avoid identification." They had "carried an axe, rope and change of clothing" to 
the victim's town, but were unable to find him for several days. Id. 
91. Id. One of the murderers received three consecutive life sentences, the other was 
sentenced to death. Dawn Fallik, Man Gets Death in Slaying of Cross Dresser and 2 Oth-
ers, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Feb. 22, 1996, at llA. 
92. Donna Minkowitz, On Trial: Gay? Straight? Boy? Girl? Sex? Rape?, OUT 
MAG., Oct. 1995, at 99. 
93. Id. 
94. James Green, Predator? Last Week 20-year-old Sean 0 'Neill Got Sent to Prison as 
a Rapist and Sex Offender Because He Slept With His 15-year-old Girlfriend Back When 
He Was 17. His Real Crime: He Was Born in a Woman's Body, BAY TIMES (San Fran-
cisco), Feb. 22, 1996, at 2, 29 [hereinafter 1. Green, Predator?]. O'Neill was sentenced to 
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time law enforcement has treated gender deception as something tantamount 
to rape."95 
It also represents perhaps the most egregious example of the law's dis-
comfort with gender elasticity. Prosecutors, anxious to determine the defen-
dant's sex before proceeding with their case, managed to convince a judge to 
sign "a court order to haul Sean into a hospital emergency room to have a 
doctor determine his gender [sic] once and for all."96 
B. DETERMINING SEx/GENDER 
There is nothing concealed that will not be revealed, or hidden 
that will not be known. 
Therefore whatever you have said in the dark shall be heard in the 
light, and whatever you have whispered in private rooms shall be 
proclaimed on the housetops.97 
By resorting to a warrant to determine the sex of the youth before pursu-
ing the case, the prosecutor opted for what might have seemed the easiest 
option: looking at genitals to establish biological sex. In so doing, the dis-
trict attorney was acting consistently with legal and medical tradition.98 In 
City of Chicago v. Wilson, for example, the cross-dressing defendants were 
hauled into the police station and were forced to "pose for pictures in vari-
ous states ofundress."99 Similarly, suspects under the ordinance at issue in 
Doe I v. McConn were required to disrobe to help officers determine 
whether the suspects truly were dressing as the opposite sex. 1 00 
Similar "look tests" for determining biological sex are used regularly in 
obstetric wards to name a child as a "boy" or "girl." This original naming 
based on visual inspection of the body is given great weight: 101 
Once the body is read, two things happen: text is subordinated to 
"90 days in the county jail, deferred until accommodations could be made so that Sean will 
not have to be housed with women or men, in consideration of his transgender status." Id. 
95. Minkowitz, supra note 92, at 100. The sentencing judge proclaimed, "This case is 
not about pedophilia, not about homosexuality, not about love or trust. This case is about 
deceit and consistency." J. Green, Predator?, supra note 94, at 29 (emphasis added). 
96. Minkowitz, supra note 92, at 142. 
97. Luke 12:2-3 (Revised Standard). 
98. Mary C. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the 
Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1131 (1979). Dunlap argues that "[t]he law 
defines every person as either male or female by reference to the genital anatomy of that 
person." Id. at 1132. 
99. City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522 (Ill. 1978). See also supra note 71 and 
accompanying text. The strip search revealed that "[b ]oth defendants were wearing bras-
sieres and garter belts; both had male genitals." Id. 
100. Doe I v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76, 79 (S.D. Tex. 1980). See also supra note 73. 
101. David, supra note 10, at 292 ("In short, a doctor or even a lay attendant says, 'It's a 
boy' or 'It's a girl.' This perfunctory determination has enduring legal significance."). 
E 
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interpretation, and later re-readings are not permitted-narrative 
time suddenly stops. As such, the birth attendant's declaration of 
the baby's sex is performative rather than descriptive, creating 
rather than describing the child's sex. 102 
These traditions notwithstanding, biological sex is not as easily ascer-
tainable as one might assume. Intersexuals, particularly those with ambigu-
ous genitals or with the external genitals of one sex but the gonads of an-
other, demonstrate that even the "look test" can at times be of little use. 103 
A person with a genital tubercle poses even greater challenges, since s/he 
could be said to have either a large clitoris or a small penis. I 04 
In fact, external genitalia are but one of a number of factors used by 
medical professionals to detennine sex. Relevant indicia include: 
1. sex chromosome constitution; 
2. gonadal sex; 
3. sex honnonal pattern; 
4. internal sex organs other than gonads (e.g., uterus or sperm 
ducts); 
5. external genitalia; 
6. secondary sexual characteristics (e.g., facial hair); 
7. sex of rearing (usually the sex assigned at birth); and 
102. Franke, supra note 3, at 53, drawing from JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 
237 (1993). Butler herself notes that "[t]he 'naming' of sex is an act of domination and 
compulsion, an institutionalized perfonnative that both creates and legislates social reality 
by requiring the discursive/perceptual construction of bodies in accord with principles of 
sexual difference." JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF 
IDENTITY 115 (1990) [hereinafter BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE]. 
103. Douglas K. Smith, Comment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the 
Law, 56 CORNELLL. REv. 963,963 n.t (1971). 
104. 
This organ [the genital tubercule] has an open gutter underneath it instead 
of a covered urethral tube. The urinary oriface [sic] is at its root or base, 
more or less in the female position. The opening at the base may be small 
and lead directly to the bladder; or it may be a quite large urogenital sinus 
from the interior of which can be traced both the urethral and vaginal pas-
sages. The latter may either connect with the cervix of the uterus or end 
blindly. Outside and below the opening, it will be ambiguous whether 
there is a scrotum with incomplete fusion or labia majora more fused than 
they should have been. 
JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY AND RELATED SYNDROMES 41 (1968), quoted in 
Note, Transsexuals in Limbo, 31 MD. L. REV. 236, 237 n.9 (1971) [hereinafter Limbo]. 
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8. assumed or psychological sex, also called "gender identity." 105 
While somewhat helpful, these indicia are ultimately inadequate. Inter-
sexuals could be classified as males by one test and as females by an-
other. 106 Moreover, there are cases in which single factors alone would still 
fail to render unambiguous results. I 07 The sex chromosome test, the most 
medically "precise" of the eight indicia, is exemplary in this regard. 
1. Sex Chromosome Test 
The appeal of the sex chromosome test lies in the fact that, of the forty-
six pairs of chromosomes in the "normal" human, males have one XY pair, 
while females have an XX pair.108 Theoretically, the routine detection of 
either an XY or XX pair would allow the test subject to be neatly placed in 
one of the two traditional sex categories. Those with genetic "defects," 
however, complicate the easy binary. Turner's syndrome (XO pattern, with 
"0" being lack of a chromosome), Klinefelter's syndrome (XXY pattern), 
and "meta-female" (XXX pattern) all defy an easy categorization. 1 09 
Since 1968, the sex chromosome test has been used in the Olympics to 
verify the "gender" of all female athletes. I I 0 The test was instituted as a 
regular practice after one female athlete who won medals in the 1964 
105. Limbo, supra note 104, at 236 n.lO. See also David, supra note 10, at 290-91; 
Smith, supra note 103, at 965. 
106. David, supra note 10, at 291. 
107. Jd. 
108. Jd. at 291 n.8; see also Wayne Scott Cole, Comment, Transsexuals in Search of Le-
gal Acceptance: The Constitutionality of the Chromosome Test, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 
331, 333 n.9 (1978). 
109. David, supra note 10, at n.8. The import of these categories is dismissed by some: 
"I personally am inclined to see slicing sex that finely as either trivial and irrelevant (given 
the minuscule number of people in other than the two generally recognized sexes) .... " 
Mary Ann C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effemi-
nate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 05 YALE L.J. 1, n.35 (1995) 
(discussing "intermediate hermaphroditic sexes"). 
The actual numbers, however, are not "miniscule." One source places the number 
of babies born with ambiguous external genitalia at approximately one in 2,000. Angier, 
supra note 11, at D8. Such babies are generally subjected to "corrective" surgery, by 
which their genitals are mutilated to approximate exclusively male or female genitalia. Jd. 
Case's trivialization reveals a mistaken underestimation of the radical destabilizing effect 
of atypical sexual categories. The destabilization is revealed by the medical reaction to 
intersexed individuals. "When an infant is born with ambiguous genitals, a hospital will 
instantly rally its experts into a huddle-----surgeons, geneticists, endocrinologists, psychia-
trists--with the goal of deciding, is this really a girl or really a boy?" Jd. 
Intersexed individuals have at times suffered fates worse than merely being defined 
as medically abnormal. As Foucault notes, "[f]or a long time hermaphrodites were crimi-
nals, or crime's offspring, since their anatomical disposition, their very being, confounded 
the law that distinguished the sexes and prescribed their union." MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE 
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION 38 (1978). 
110. Pamela B. Fastiff, Note, Gender Verification Testing: Balancing the Rights of Fe-
male Athletes with a Scandal-Free Olympic Games, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 937, 938 
(1992). 
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Olympics was later discovered to be a "man" when testing revealed the pres-
ence of the Y (male) chromosome'! 11 
This testing practice has been criticized as being over- and underinclu-
sive: it identifies women with genetic defects who have no muscular advan-
tage, while missing those who do have such an advantage. 112 Moreover, 
genetically abnormal "males," such as XXY and :xx males, would pass the 
test, and would have to be allowed to compete as women, in spite of the fact 
that they "may have a normal male body build, male muscle strength, and a 
male psychological and social orientation."113 
In addition to its predictive inaccuracy, the test presents constitutional 
concerns in some contexts. In the case of a transsexual marrying or modify-
ing her/his birth certificate, using the test may violate herlhis right to equal 
protection, since "[t]here is no rational relation between the chromosome test 
and any state interest in these two contexts."114 A thorough exploration of 
this particular issue is beyond the scope of this Note'! 15 
2. The Eight Factors 
Rather than using the sex chromosome test, many commentators advo-
cate using a mixture of the eight indicia, with an emphasis on psychology 
and gender self-identity. Smith argues that "the psychological sex of an in-
dividual should be the single most important standard used to judge his [sic] 
legal sex.,,116 Others concur, using somewhat synonymous terms: "the 
eighth factor, gender identity, is arguably the most important;"117 "[t]he es-
sential criterion is gender or sexual identity, namely whether the person 
considers himself or herself to be a male or a female."1l8 Franke cautions 
that "[t]o conceptualize both sexual identity and sex discrimination in terms 
of biology at all is to ignore the role that gender stereotypes play in the con-
struction of sexual difference."119 
111. Id. at 939. There have been no "impostors" since. Id. at 940. Nonetheless, the 
testing continues. In fact, the International Olympic Committee is even considering 
switching to the more straightforward visual examination. Karen Rosen, Visual Inspection 
for Gender Replacing Chromosome Test, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Dec. 5,1991, at F6. 
112. Fastiff, supra note 110, at 944. 
113. Id. at 944-45. 
114. Cole, supra note 108, at 355. Cole considers and rejects several possible state in-
terests that might justify sex chromosome testing under rational basis review pursuant to 
the Equal Protection clause: the state interest in same sex marriage; in the ability to con-
summate the marriage; in discouraging homosexual conduct; in procreation; in administra-
tive convenience; in accuracy of public records; in preventing fraud; in using public records 
to aid the psychologically ill; and in birth certificates reflecting facts at the time of birth. 
Id. at 345-54. 
115. For a general discussion, see Cole, supra note 108. 
116. Smith, supra note 103, at 969. 
117. David, supra note 10, at 292. 
118. Green, supra note 7, at 126. 
119. Franke, supra note 3, at 39. She argues for the "cultural genital," which 
is a metaphor for both the physical genital that is not presently in view but 
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Another group of commentators calls for a balancing of the various 
factors. Cole suggests that "courts should . . . reject the chromosome test 
and instead adopt the gender-anatomy test of sex."120 A concurring Note 
posits that "U]udicial fairness requires that society determine sex on the ba-
sis of psychological identity and anatomical appearance."121 Fastiff, on the 
other hand, would "take into consideration not only a person's chromo-
somes, but her external appearance and her own gender identity."122 This 
latter approach was adopted by Judge Grady in the overturned lower court 
decision extending Title VII protection to transsexuals. 123 
C. LA W VERSUS MEDICINE 
With eight factors to balance and choose between, the question arises: 
who should do the balancing? There has been much debate in legal scholar-
ship about whether law or medicine should determine what constitutes sex-
ual identity. Some assert that law should not decide questions of sex, but 
should instead "accept medical decisions in this area and give them the legal 
effect that is in the best interests of the individual or society."124 This ar-
gument assumes that courts must defer to the expertise of doctors, "for at its 
base, sex determination is an extra-legal matter, becoming legal only under 
certain conditions." 125 
Other commentators, however, point out that medicine is merely de-
scriptive, while the law is normative. 126 Franke argues that "the law's rela-
tionship to sexual identity" can be understood by comparing 
the difference between judicial statements that describe a state of af-
fairs and judicial statements that bring about a state of affairs . . . . 
These two types of juridical speech acts are imbued with two differ-
ent kinds of normativity . . .. In the ftrst case, the aspiration is that 
the judge's words fit the world, whereas in the second case the 
which the person is assumed to have and the gendered schema that con-
structs women as certain kinds of beings and men as their opposite. This 
schema is made manifest in a system of gendered cues that communicates 
the signs of gender, signs that we regard as reliable signifiers of one's "true 
sex." 
ld. (citing HAROLD GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 116-85 (1967». 
120. Cole, supra note 108, at 355. 
121. Limbo, supra note 104, at 254. 
122. Fastiff, supra note 110, at 961. 
123. Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 825 (recognizing the chromosome test, self-perception and 
social perception as all informing the determination of sex). See also supra notes 76-77 
and accompanying text. 
124. Smith, supra note 103, at 972. 
125. Gould, supra note 70, at 432. 
126. David, supra note 10, at 338. Moreover, "[a]dopting a medical model has ... seri-
ous and severe limitations because it shifts the locus of responsibility from society to the 
individual." Gould, supra note 70, at 441. 
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world is changed to fit the judge's words. 127 
The transgender cases reveal that judges are exercising the latter type of 
juridical speech-changing the world through their words. The Seventh 
Circuit's decision in Ulane is a prime example of judicial construction of 
sexual identity: 
Ulane is entitled to any personal belief about her sexual identity she 
desires. After the surgery, hormones, appearance changes, and a 
new Illinois birth certificate and FAA pilot's certificate, it may be 
that society, as the trial judge found, considers Ulane to be female. 
But even if one believes that a woman can be so easily created 
from what remains of a man, that does not decide this case. 128 
The tone of the opinion suggests that the original sexual declaration 
("It's a boy!"), by a long-forgotten birth attendant who could not have pos-
sibly known that the infant KennethlKaren' s gender did not match hislher 
physical sex, was still controlling for the Ulane court. By denying her claim 
of sex discrimination, the court implicitly derogated Karen's claim that she 
was truly female. By invalidating her expressed sexuaVgender identity, the 
court's opinion inevitably helped to shape and color society's shared under-
standing of sexual reality. Thus the holding in Ulane quietly proclaimed 
that even sex reassignment will not necessarily ensure social recognition of 
one's self-perceived gender identity. 
Through its trans gender jurisprudence, the legal system creates our 
shared social reality. Legislators and judges should be careful to craft gen-
der policy based on a totality of the social and individual factors. 
David has argued for placing the locus of determinative weight with ei-
ther the executive or legislature, according to medicine's explanatory ability. 
He suggests that administrative agencies can make the determination in easy 
cases, meaning for those individuals for whom medicine can provide precise 
and easily understood tests. If simple tests would not suffice, as they would 
not for an XXY male with an outwardly female appearance, or for an inter-
sexual, the legislature should make the determination. 129 His argument con-
cerning the hard cases is interesting. Were society's elected representatives 
to pass laws defming sex, we would return to the judicial approach of the 
seventeenth century Viriginia General Court's decision in Thomas(ine) Hall. 
This mayor may not be the best answer, but it is safe to say at least that the 
127. Franke, supra note 3, at 51 (emphasis added). 
128. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1987 (emphasis added). 
129. David, supra note 10, at 338. One Note suggests a "joint undertaking" by both the 
medical and legal communities, involving an "interprofessional recognition and advance-
ment of the idea that individuals have more social utility and economic capacity if they are 
psychologically and anatomically congruent." Jeannine S. Haag & Tami L. Sullinger, Is 
He or Isn't She? Transsexualism: Legal Impediments to Integrating a Product of Medical 
Definition and Technology, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 342, 371 (1982). 
, , 
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courts' reliance on medical knowledge alone "might be considered at best 
myopic." 130 
If law is to be the institution making the decision,131 one commentator 
suggests that "[b ]ecause the law is primarily concerned with human relation-
ships, only those biological factors which influence person-to-person inter-
actions should be criteria used in determining a person's legal sex."132 This 
offers little practical guidance, however, not least because of the arguable 
cultural relativity of the social perception of biological traits. 133 
Ultimately, the key to resolving this problem lies in recognizing that the 
legal field is an unstable "interpretive field of practice where identifications 
may be shifted and reformed."134 When the discussion moves beyond es-
tablished identities, when "nonidentities" are formulated, a powerful 
"dialectical engagement between subject positions and juridical fields of 
power" is revealed. 135 In practice, the transgendered subject is interacting 
with and being shaped by the interpretive fields of both medicine and law. 
On a more theoretical level, slhe is faced with one of the "juridical fields of 
power" most inimical to a positive and fluid trans gender identity: the field 
of legal theory known as essentialism, particularly sex/gender essentialism. 
III. TRADITIONAL SEX/GENDER ESSENTIALISM 
A. ESSENTIALISM 
Essentialism can be defmed as "a belief in true essence--that which is 
most irreducible, unchanging, and therefore constitutive of a given person or 
thing."136 In the present context, essentialism would posit that women and 
men "are identified as such on the basis of transhistorical, eternal, immuta-
ble essences."137 There would be, in other words, something in each that 
was inherently woman or inherently man. Given that each had a different 
essence, comparisons between the two would be pointless, even problematic: 
130. Gould, supra note 70, at 432. 
131. Use of the law is not without severe limitations. Patricia Williams notes, in a dis-
cussion of the law and race, that "the constitutional foreground of rights was shaped by 
whites, parceled out to blacks in pieces, ordained from on high in small favors, random 
insulting gratuities." PATRICIA WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW 
PROFESSOR 164 (1991). Similar problems plague each disempowered group in its pursuit 
of rights: begging for crumbs of legitimacy from the mainstream masters. The transgen-
dered are certainly not excepted. 
132. Limbo, supra note 104, at 241. 
133. Gould, supra note 70, at 430 ("Social standards for femininity and masculinity will 
alter as cultural determinants shift .... Thus what constitutes 'masculinity' in one epoch 
might well constitute 'femininity' in another."). 
134. Lisa C. Bower, Queer Acts and the Politics of "Direct Address": Rethinking Law, 
Culture, and Community, 28 L. & Soc. REV. 1009,1014 (1994). 
135. Id. at 1015. 
136. DIANA Fuss, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE & DIFFERENCE 2 (1989). 
137. Id. at xi. 
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better to take each on its own terms, and judge the sexes by their own stan-
dards. 138 In classical legal terms, essentialism calls for an analysis of 
women sui generis: in a class by themselves, outside the scope of a tradi-
tionally patriarchal legal structure which has consistently devalued them. 
History reveals, however, that consideration sui generis has done little 
to advance the cause of women's struggle for independence and liberation. 
Over a century ago, in the course of upholding a law denying women the 
right to practice law, the U.S. Supreme Court used essentialist language in 
explaining that 
[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the 
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil 
life . . ., The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill 
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of 
the Creator. 139 
These views are unfortunately not merely the curious artifacts of nine-
teenth century jurisprudence. Less than twenty years ago, the Supreme 
Court drew on essentialist notions in holding that a "woman's relative ability 
to maintain order in a male, maximum-security, unclassified penitentiary ... 
could be directly reduced by her womanhood.,,140 
In the present context, an essentialist would resist accepting the notion 
of a trans gender identity. If men and women have immutable essences, how 
could a manly essence be housed in a woman, or vice versa? F or those who 
mix and match elements of either gender (e.g., those engaging in genderfuck 
drag I41 ), the either/or categories are patently unusable. A radical dyke 
wearing, for instance, a tuxedo with a strap-on dildo protruding prominently 
through the fabric over the crotch of her pants is arguably not adhering to a 
universal female essence. Of course, if the concept of female essence were 
more expansive, such variation could be included in its definition. But rec-
ognition of such variation would necessarily debase the strict purity required 
by the essentialist project. 
B. ANTI-ESSENTIALISM/SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 
Standing in staunch opposition to essentialist thought are the construc-
138. Essentialism should not be confused with difference feminism. Some advocates of 
the di fference feminism, such as Carol Gilligan, argue that not only do women and men 
have distinct and mutually exclusive traits, but gender alone actually determines an indi-
vidual's perspective on legal and moral issues. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A 
DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). Essentialism, on the other hand, "is typically defined in opposi-
tion to di fference; the doctrine of essence is viewed as precisely that which seeks to deny 
or to annul the very radicality of difference." Fuss, supra note 136, at xii. 
139. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (130 Wall.) 141 (1873). 
140. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977). 
141. Defined supra note 15. 
db 
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tionists, who argue that "essence" itself is historically constructed. 142 These 
anti-essentialists argue for "interrogating the intricate and interlacing proc-
esses which work together to produce all seemingly 'natural' or 'given' ob-
jects."143 At heart, they are concerned "with the production and organiza-
tion of differences, and they therefore reject the idea that any essential or 
natural givens precede the processes of social determination."144 
Some of the more critical anti-essentialists have gone even further, 
charging that the supposedly universal essence of women championed by the 
essentialists has actually been defmed (or socially determined) by only the 
experiences of white, middle class women. 145 In the place of this false sin-
gularity, some antiessentialists use the notion of "multiple consciousness" to 
recognize that various facets of identity subject to oppression, such as gen-
der, race, class, sexual orientation, age and ability, are all interconnected in 
"inextricable webs."146 
Although commendable for challenging the assumptions underlying both 
essentialist and much mainstream feminist discussions of the similar-
ity/difference between the sexes/genders, the social constructionists/anti-
essentialists nonetheless fail in their discussions of women and men to ques-
tion a more fundamental assumption: that the two genders are themselves 
stable, discrete bases for identity. As the discussion of the sex chromosome 
test and genital look test has indicated, the poles of the biological 
male/female sexual binary have proven to be far from dependable or pre-
dictable, or even neatly ascertainable. Applying the binary to the social 
construction of gender offers no greater promise of conceptual stability .14 7 
Drawing heavily on the work of Judith Butler, it is my contention that 
the attempt at pinpointing a permanent identity along the continuum between 
the sex/gender binary poles will be sufficiently precarious and problematic 
to justify, even necessitate, a laissez-faire approach by the courts to the 
question of gender identity.148 
142. Fuss, supra note 136, at 2. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 2-3. 
145. See generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990). 
146. Id. at 587. 
147. This social constructionist approach has been counterattacked by some staunch bi-
narists. See, e.g., JOliN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY AND RELATED SYNDROMES: A 
GUIDE TO COUNSELING CmLDREN, ADOLESCENTS, AND THEIR FAMILIES 6 (1994) ("It simply 
does not make sense to talk of a third sex, or of a fourth or fifth, when the phylogenetic 
scheme of things is two sexes. Those who are genitally neither male nor female but in-
complete are not a third sex. They are a mixed sex or an in-between sex. To advocate 
medical nonintervention is irresponsible."). 
148. Dunlap suggests replacing the two-sex assumption with a situationally variable 
identity: a person "could make different determinations as to sex identification for various 
purposes, such as education, marriage, living arrangements, or personal physical appear-
ance." Dunlap, supra note 98, at 1138. This appears to be the approach taken by Tho-
• 
• 
220 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:1 
IV. TOWARD A MORE ENLIGHTENED APPROACH 
There are many ways to describe people who have mixed their sexual 
identity and gender identity: transsexual, transvestite, intersexual, and an-
drogyne. Nonetheless, the law has been steadfast in classifying individuals 
within a bipolar model of sex and gender. 149 One commentator, recognizing 
that transsexuals have proven that biological sex is not necessarily fixed to 
the sex of birth, and that the medical establishment itself has demonstrated 
the difficulty in pinpointing an individual's sex, argues that this has pro-
voked a renewed interest in asserting the male/female binary. In her words: 
The resurrection of the male/female binary is motivated both by 
medico-juridical definitions of successful trans sexuality and by the 
juridical need to reaffirm the meanings of male and female that have 
been paradoxically unsettled by a medical discourse objectively af-
firming the instability of "sex" as an anatomical or biological cate-
gory.150 
Although presented with the possibility that there might be more than 
two discrete sexes, courts have been firm in their refusal to seriously con-
sider the inclusion of new identities .151 There is of course the danger of 
generating multiple subcategories. Mary Ann Case analogizes to the harm-
ful splintering of racial identities into fine gradations based on the relative 
fraction of racial composition. 152 In light of the potential for the fragmen-
tation of identity for transgendered individuals, both rigid dichotomies and 
elaborate taxonomies must be resisted. A fluid continuum between the poles 
of the male/female binary could accommodate variation while avoiding the 
danger of splintering. By using a more malleable model for sex/gender 
149. Colker, supra note 12, at 65. 
150. Bower, supra note 134, at 1024. 
151. Franke, supra note 3, at 49-50 (footnotes omitted). Some doctors show similar re-
sistance. See, e.g., MONEY, supra note 147, at 6. 
Martha Minow notes the danger of multiple SUbcategories in her discussion of the 
social construction of race in America in the 1920s. Finding that the tripartite 
white/"Negro"f'Indian" schema apparently had no room for people of Mexican or Asian 
descent, the Supreme Court treated them as the functional equivalent of ''Indians''-more 
than slaves but less than free whites. "In retrospect, these results seem arbitrary. The le-
gal authorities betrayed a striking inability to reshape their own categories for people who 
did not fit." Martha Minow, Foreword, The Supreme Court 1986 Term, Justice Engen-
dered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10,70-71 (1987) (referring to Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 
178, 195 (1922)( emphasis added)). 
152. Case offers this interesting cautionary criticism: 
I personally am inclined to see slicing sex that fmely as . . . more troubling 
than liberating (risking the reinforcement of hierarchies such as the ever 
fmer slicing of racial classifications from Black and White to quadroon and 
octoroon in antebellum Louisiana, or the distinction between Black, White, 
and Colored in South African apartheid law). 
Case, supra note 109, at 15 n.35. 
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identity, transgendered individuals can "articulate the convergence of multi-
ple sexual discourses at the site of 'identity' in order to render that category, 
in whatever form, permanently problematic."153 
It is noteworthy that transsexuals have at times unfortunately been ac-
cused of reaffirming the stability of the male/female binary. One Note has 
argued that "[t]he transsexual is distinguishable from the homosexual in the 
eyes of the law by her renaturalizing of rigid gender categories and by her 
ability to pass. The state affords her benefits that it denies to gays and les-
bians because she can be read as reinforcing rather than subverting the 
boundary between masculinity and femininity." 154 This critique arises from 
the fact that a transsexual who has successfully undergone sex reassignment 
surgery "could fit at one of the poles rather than at the middle." 155 Along 
these lines, a writer for a major national gay and lesbian magazine mischar-
acterizes transsexuals and gays/lesbians as engaged in "fundamentally dif-
ferent struggles."156 Specifically, she aligns transsexuals with sexual es-
sentialists, and gays/lesbians with social constructionists. 157 
By arguing for exclusively fluid identities, and denigrating fixed identi-
ties, these critics ignore the radical impact of biological sex reassignment on 
our notions of gender identity. While one critic does acknowledge that 
''transsexuality may be more destabilizing than homosexuality," slbe charac-
terizes hislber analysis as having "deconstructed the illness trope and intro-
duced the idea ofpassing."158 To dismiss true gender dysphoria and praise 
the post-operative transsexual as nothing more complicated than the epitome 
of "passing" is to profoundly misunderstand and mischaracterize the reality 
and symbolism of trans sexuality. Dismissing the transsexual's desire to 
make biology conform at last to herlhis gender identity misses the radically 
performative nature of even biological sex. The notion of sexlgender-as-
performance will be discussed more fully below. 
The attempt at ordering fluid gender identities above those that are fixed 
is misguided and even dangerous. In the analogous context of sexuality, 
Gayle Rubin warns against the implications of such privileging and vilifica-
153. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 102, at 28. 
154. Note, Patriarchy Is Such a Drag: The Strategic Possibilities of a Postmodem Ac-
count of Gender, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1973, 1992-93 (1995) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
Patriarchy Is Such a Drag]. 
155. Colker, supra note 12, at 44. Colker does not make this characterization. She notes 
that "[w]hether the postoperative transsexual fits into a pole depends on whether he or she 
'passes. ' The postoperative transsexual who does not pass is left in the indeterminate 
middle category (for example, with respect to sex-segregated bathrooms) with neither men 
nor women wanting to claim him or her as their own." Id. (footnote omitted). 
156. Minkowitz, supra note 92, at 146. Bisexuals, and of course transgenders, are con-
spicuously absent from both the magazine's title (Out Magazine: America's Bestselling 
Gay and Lesbian Magazine) and from most of its commentary. 
157. Id. 
158. Patriarchy Is Such a Drag, supra note 154, at 1993. 
t 
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tion.159 She notes that in the traditional social schema, married, reproduc-
tive heterosexuals occupy the highest social strata, monogamous homo-
sexuals and bisexuals fall in the middle, and toward the bottom are found the 
dregs of society, including transsexuals, transvestites, sadomasochists, and 
sex workers (e.g., prostitutes, porn models, erotic dancers). Rubin argues 
that such hierarchies are far from innocuous: "As sexual behaviors or occu-
pations fall lower on the scale, the individuals who practice them are sub-
jected to a presumption of mental illness, disreputability, criminality, re-
stricted social and physical mobility, loss of institutional support, and 
economic sanctions." 160 
This privileging and vilification was demonstrated in 1988 by Texas 
State District Court Judge Jack Hampton, who refused a life sentence for a 
defendant convicted of killing two gay men. 161 Hampton explained that "I 
put prostitutes and gays at about the same level and I'd be hard put to give 
somebody life for killing a prostitute. "162 A similar disregard for the worth 
of transgendered people has already been noted: the institutionalization of 
the "GID aftlicted," the arrest of cross-dressers, and the murder of trans-
sexuals. 
A. AMBIGUITY 
[T]he body can no longer be seen as a biological given which 
emits its own meaning. It must be understood instead as an en-
semble of potentialities which are given meaning only in soci-
ety.163 
If gender is not tied to sex, either causally or expressively, then 
gender is a kind of action that can potentially proliferate beyond 
the binary limits imposed by the apparent binary of sex. . .. But 
how would such a project become culturally conceivable and avoid 
the fate of an impossible and vain utopian project? 164 
As discussed above, the General Court of Virginia in Thomas(ine) Hall 
took a comparatively unusual stance toward gender/sex ambiguity in the 
159. Rubin, supra note 85, at 267. 
160. ld. 
161. Lisa Belkin, Texas Judge Eases Sentence for Killer of 2 Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 17, 1988, §1, at 8, cited and discussed in Jonathan Willmott, Victim Characteristics 
and Equal Protection for the Lives of All: An Alternative Analysis of Booth v. Maryland 
and South Carolina v. Gathers and a Proposed Standard for the Admission of Victim 
Characteristics in Sentencing, 56 BROOK. 1. REv. 1045, 1047 (1990). 
162. ld. Hampton further stated that if the victims "had not been out there spreading 
AIDS around, they'd still be alive today." ld. 
163. JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 122-23 (1985), quoted in Franke, 
supra note 3, at 71. 
164. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 102, at 112. 
, 
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middle seventeenth century. 165 It is unclear from the record whether Hall 
was an intersexual, whether s/he had a genital tubercle or other genital 
anomaly, or whether s/he was an androgynous male with a small penis and 
undescended testicles or an androgynous female with a large clitoris. Re-
gardless of what s/he technically was, the case is noteworthy for how the le-
gal system resolved the dilemma. Recognizing the impossibility of working 
within the sexual binary, the court transcended established categories and 
proclaimed the defendant to be both woman and man. This case is thus a 
prime example of how "[b ]iological sex is revealed to have no inevitable 
natural meaning, but only the social meaning attached to it on the basis of 
gender identity. "166 By ordering the publication of this determination in 
Hall's community, that all might "know" what s/he was, the court explicitly 
revealed the blatant social construction not only of gender, but of the under-
standing of biological sex itself. 167 
Thomas(ine) Hall is nonetheless problematic in some respects. Al-
though the court recognized that the categories of "woman" and "man" are 
not fixed in stone, it was unwilling to allow Hall the true freedom to either 
move fluidly between masculine and feminine appearance and identity, or to 
live for periods as a man or a woman or both according to whim, as in fact 
s/he had done for most of herlhis life. Instead of allowing Hall unfettered 
discretion in herlhis personal appearance and identity, the court reimposed 
the male/female binary in gross caricature: by forcing Hall to wear both 
women's and men's clothing, the court forced herlhirn into stylistic admix-
ture, a liminal no-person's-land of outfits doomed to be perceived as freak-
ish. In terms of dress, s/he would no longer fit into either world. 
Hall was not alone in being treated as an oddity. Transgendered indi-
viduals exhibiting ambiguous identities have long been reduced to circus 
freaks. 168 Such delegitimization allows the kind of disregard for transgen-
dered lives evidenced by the various attacks on transgendered people dis-
cussed above-most notably the slayings of Debbie Forte and Brandon 
Teena, and the criminal proceedings against Sean O'Neill. The medical and 
legal establishments must be held accountable for the oppressive norms they 
generate. 
165. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
166. Patriarchy Is Such a Drag. supra note 154, at 1993. 
167. This is not to suggest that there existed a ''neutral'' body prior to (re)nam:ing. The 
complex interplay of sex and social construction will be discussed below. 
168. "When there were circus side-shows, people gawked at the 'famous bearded lady' 
or the 'incredible man-woman.' After the freak shows, there were the movies-most no-
tably Fellini's SATYRICON, in which a pale, feeble hermaphroditic youth is disrobed and 
shown to have both a penis and breasts." (citation omitted). Angier, supra note 11, at D8. 
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B. CROSSING INTo TIIE THEORETICAL FRONTIER 
Is there a "physical" body prior to the perceptually perceived body? 
An impossible question to decide. 169 
Joined, our bodies have passage into one/without merging 
* * * 
And while the we conspires/to make secret its two eyes 
we search the other shoreljor some crossing home. 170 
Esther Newton, in a famous anthropological study of female impersona-
tors, noted that while it seems obvious that "men" have to artificially create 
the image of "women," women themselves have to create it through arti-
fice. I71 Listing the items used by impersonators-"long hair, 'feminine' 
make-up and dress, 'feminine' jewelry, bosom (false or hormone-induced), 
and high-heeled shoes,"-she points out that ''the only item listed that is in-
trinsically more 'faked' for a male is the bosom. But what of padded 
bras?"172 
Judith Butler argues that "three contingent dimensions of significant 
corporeality" are involved in this discussion: anatomical sex, gender iden-
tity, and gender performance. 173 Both male and female cross-dressing in-
volve all three in complex interplay. She suggests that cross-dressing, by 
imitating settled notions of a gender not considered by society to be one's 
own (due to expectations based on anatomy), "implicitly reveals the imita-
tive structure of gender itself-as well as its contingency. "174 This suggests 
that there exists 
a radical contingency in the relation between sex and gender in the 
169. BUILER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 102, at 114. 
170. AUDRE LORDE, Bridge Through My Window, in CHOSEN POEMs--OLD AND NEW 17-
18 (1982). 
171. ESTHER NEWTON, MOTHER CAMP: FEMALE IMPERSONATORS IN AMERICA 5 n.14 (2d 
ed. 1979) [hereinafter NEWTON, MOTHER CAMP]' Female pop culture icons are an excel-
lent case in point. Carole-Anne Tyler asserts that 
the likes of Dolly Parton and Madonna (and their satin queen or Wanna-Be 
parodies or imitations) [have become] more than chicks with cheek; they 
have become draped crusaders for the social constructionist cause, catching 
gender in the act-as an act-so as to demonstrate there is no natural, es-
sential, biological basis to gender identity or sexual orientation. 
Carole-Anne Tyler, Boys Will Be Girls: The Politics of Gay Drag, in INsIDFlOur: 
LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 32 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991). 
172. NEWTON, MOTHER CAMP, supra note 171, at 5 n.14 
173. BUILER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 102, at 137. She explains that "[i]fthe anat-
omy of the performer is already distinct from the gender of the performer, and both of 
those are distinct from the gender of the performance, then the performance suggests a dis-
sonance not only between sex and performance, but sex and gender, and gender and per-
formance." ld. 
174. ld. 
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face of cultural configurations of causal unities that are regularly 
assumed to be natural and necessary .... [W]e see sex and gender 
denaturalized by means of a performance which avows their dis-
tinctness and dramatizes the cultural mechanism of their fabricated 
unity. 175 
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Kennedy and Davis, in their account of a lesbian community in Buffalo, 
N.Y., offer a good case in point: "Butch and fern mannerisms [in the 
1940's] were modeled on male-female behavior as portrayed in the Holly-
wood movies of the period. They included all the little details of presenting 
one's self-manner of walking, sitting, holding a drink, tone ofvoice."176 If 
both women and men have to create the illusion of "woman" or "man," 
whether dressing or cross-dressing, the costume of womanhood/manhood is 
revealed to be a gendered interpretation of what it means to be a "woman" or 
a "man." Yet the interpretation is not expressive of any a priori (dare we 
say essential?) identity, but rather a performance of cultural expectations. 
Moving to a deeper level, Butler asks, "[a]re there ever humans who are 
not, as it were, always already gendered?"177 She argues that there are not, 
since the crucial naming of a child as "boy" or "girl" marks its moment of 
humanization. 178 Her answer is unfortunate insofar as it appears to confuse 
sex with gender: is the boy/girl label not indicative of biological sex rather 
than gender identity? Nonetheless, given that, by her definition, no human is 
pregender, the question arises: "If gender is always there, delimiting in ad-
vance what qualifies as the human, how can we speak of a human who be-
comes its gender, as if gender were a postscript or a cultural after-
thought?"179 The question is rhetorical, for the Butlerian position appears 
to be that one does not become a gender as much as one behaves in a gen-
dered manner. In other words, gender is not so much who one is, but rather 
what one does. The implication is that "[i]f gender attributes . . . are not 
expressive but performative, then these attributes effectively constitute the 
identity they are said to express or reveal." 180 
If all gender is a performance, a "dramatic and contingent construction 
of meaning,"181 from where do the norms that are played with and chal-
lenged arise? In the case of the lesbians in Buffalo, from where did Holly-
wood derive the male-female behavioral patterns on which the women based 
their performance? Butler answers with the paradox that "gender is a kind 
of imitation for which there is no original; in fact, it is a kind of imitation 
175. Id. (emphasis added). 
176. KENNEDY & DAVIS, supra note 39, at 157. 
177. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 102, at Ill. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. (emphasis added). 
180. Id. at 141. 
181. Id. at 139. 
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that produces the very notion of the original as an effect and consequence of 
the imitation itself."182 Stated differently, "'the original' is revealed to be a 
copy, and an inevitably failed one, an ideal that no one can embody."183 If 
no one can actually embody original gender, the use of the law to punish so-
called gender deviance raises troubling questions. 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW 
Given the radical contingency of gender, the offensiveness of using the 
legal system to punish transgendered individuals becomes clear. The prose-
cution of Sean O'Neill for "criminal impersonation of the opposite gen-
der," 184 for instance, is a frightening indication of the extent to which the 
state will go to enforce arbitrary gender-related behavioral roles. The va-
grancy statute in both Archibald185 and Gillespie186 was used to punish the 
male defendants not for disguising themselves "in some basic anatomical 
sense, but for donning artifacts socially associated with women." 187 Both 
cases reflect a similar abuse of the state's power to coerce adherence to gen-
dered clothing norms. Police harassment of butch lesbians for failure to 
wear at least two items of feminine clothing 188 is revealed to be nothing less 
than homophobic depredation by the state's uniformed thugs. And the Perez 
court's consideration of female cross-dressing as relevant evidence of motive 
for murder189 strains belief. 
As these cases reveal, the law's need for set, predictable rules for behav-
ior "necessarily flounders when faced with variations of gender related be-
havior where, in fact, it is futile to establish a 'norm. "'190 Transgendered 
individuals simply defy the medical and legal attempts to construct norma-
tive categories around dress, behavior, identity, and even biology.191 Karl 
Klare argues that 
[n]onconforming appearance choices can be highly subversive of the 
182. Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN 
THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 21 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991). 
Butler explains that "[i]f gender is drag, and if it is an imitation that regularly pro-
duces the ideal it attempts to approximate, then gender is a performance that produces the 
illusion of an inner sex or essence or psychic gender core; it produces on the skin, through 
the gesture, the move, the gait (that array of corporeal theatrics understood as gender pres-
entation), the illusion of an inner depth." Id. at 28. 
183. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 102, at 139. 
184. See generally Minkowitz, supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
185. People v. Archibald, 296 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1968). 
186. People v. Gillespie, 254 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1964). 
187. Whisner, supra note 8, at 100. 
188. KENNEDY & DAVIS, supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
189. Perez v. State, 491 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1973). 
190. Gould, supra note 70, at 432. 
19l. Butler argues that "[t]here are no direct expressive or causal lines between sex, 
gender, gender presentation, sexual practice, fantasy, or sexuality. None of these terms 
captures or determines the rest." Butler, supra note 182, at 25. 
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status quo and therefore particularly in need of legal protection. 
Appearance practices sometimes disrupt and shake-up settled un-
derstandings and roles, and they may dramatically suggest 
("dramatically," in both senses) the need for new discursive possi-
bilities and altered power relationships. 192 
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Ultimately, revealing gender to be nothing more than a '''performance, '" 
a "'masquerade, '" would force not only a reevaluation of gender as a stable 
binary, but would actually "call into question the system of 'masculine he-
gemony and heterosexist power' that underwrites them."193 It is therefore 
not surprising to find that the society has been resolute in meting out pun-
ishment, both legal and extra-legal, for those who would dare to challenge 
settled understandings of the meanings of gender. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the issue of a transgender identity might appear to mainstream 
society to involve no more than the trials and tribulations of bizarre people 
on the fringes of society, the interest in being able to cross gender and sex 
lines is actually far from de minimis. The legal persecution oftransgendered 
people has chilling Orwellian overtones: "The more comprehensive the gov-
ernment's authority to enforce the law's two-sex presumption [and its con-
comitant gender role expectations], and to punish departures from it, via 
probes into the mental and psychological makeup of the individual [as well 
as by dramatic emergency room inspections of genitalia], the more worthless 
is the individual's right to privacy."194 
As we have seen, even medicine cannot substantiate the essentialist 
claim that the poles of the biological sex binary are absolute. Gendered 
identities based on (at times) unstable sex identities are more hopelessly 
complicated than the established medico-legal models allow. Given such a 
heavily problematized juridical discourse, using the law to persecute trans-
gendered individuals, who unavoidably chafe against society's arbitrary 
limits for acceptable identity, is unconscionable. 
192. Karl E. Klare, PowerlDressing; Regulation of Employee Appearance, 25 NEW ENG. 
L. REv. 1395 (1992). 
193. Bower, supra note 134, at 1027 (quoting BU1LER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 
100, at 33). 
194. Dunlap, supra 98, at 1141. 
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